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Non-Technical Summary
The increased globalization of the world economy has stirred the fear that
domestic employment will be relocated to the lower wage countries. The signing of
the NAFTA agreements in the US and the liberalization of the economies in Central
and Eastern Europe, which resulted in the Association Agreements with the EU, have
contributed to this fear. This has driven an ongoing debate about the role of
international trade in contributing to labor market distortions. However, there is still
no consensus about the extent to which globalization has mattered in affecting the
demand for home jobs.
One of the most obvious channels through which home jobs may be affected is
the employment allocation of multinational enterprises (MNEs). However,
surprisingly little work has been done on how labor demand decisions of MNEs with
affiliates in different locations are driven by labor cost differentials. This paper uses
data on over 1,200 European MNEs and their affiliates to analyze how parent
employment may be relocated to their subsidiaries in response to relative wage
differentials between the parent company and its affiliate(s). Our data set contains
MNEs with affiliates that are located in the EU, in Central and Eastern Europe or both
and it covers the period between 1994-98, a period in which worldwide foreign direct
investment has grown rapidly.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) We find that on average
relocation of parent jobs to subsidiaries of MNEs does occur. However, contrary to
the popular belief, this relocation effect is mainly taking place between parents and
their EU based subsidiaries, not between parents and their low cost Central and East
European based subsidiaries. (ii) This relocation of jobs between parent firms and its
affiliate(s) is mainly driven by firms that are operating in the manufacturing sector.
For firms operating in the service sectors we find no evidence of employment
relocation, while for firms that operate in the wholesale sectors (distribution) we find
relocation to the lower wage subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe.
The results of this paper suggest that foreign direct investment in Central and
Eastern Europe is mainly taking place to obtain market access and to achieve a
strategic position in the emerging markets, rather than to exploit cheap labour costs.
In contrast, foreign direct investment within the EU seems to be driven by labour cost
differences. Relocation seems to occur mainly between parent firms and their3
subsidiaries within the EU. This suggests that the opening of Central and Eastern
Europe does not pose a threat to job opportunities in the EU.4
Abstract
This paper analyzes the demand for labor by home multinational enterprises
(MNEs) in Europe. To this end we use a unique firm level panel data set of more than
1,200 European multinational enterprises and their subsidiaries that are located in
either the European Union, Central and Eastern Europe or both.
We investigate whether employment in the MNEs’ subsidiaries are substitutes for
home employment or in other words we investigate whether European MNEs can
easily relocate employment between the parent and their daughter(s).
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) We find evidence for
substitution effects between parent and foreign employment. A decline of 10% in
MNE affiliate’s wage costs is associated with a decline in parent employment of
between 1.5% and 2% on average. (ii) This effect is mainly driven by firms that
operate in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the substitution effects mainly take
place between EU parents and their affiliates located within the EU, rather than
affiliates located in Central and Eastern Europe. (iii) We also report results for the
non-manufacturing firms, where we find no substitution effects between parents and
daughters in the service sectors, while we do find positive substitution effects between
parents and their affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe for the firms operating in the
wholesale trade and construction sectors.
Our results suggest that on average the competition from low wage countries
in Central and Eastern Europe did not contribute to a relocation of domestic jobs to
Central and Eastern Europe. Substitution effects do take place, however, they mainly
occur between parent firms and their affiliates that are located in the European Union.
JEL classification: F23, J23
Key words: Relocation, Multinational Enterprises, Labor Demand5
1. Introduction
The increased globalization of the world economy has stirred the fear that
domestic employment will be relocated to the lower wage countries. The signing of
the NAFTA agreements in the US and the liberalization of the economies in Central
and Eastern Europe, which resulted in the Association Agreements with the EU, have
contributed to this fear. This has driven an ongoing debate about the role of
international trade in contributing to labor market distortions
1. However, there is still
no consensus about the extent to which globalization has mattered in affecting the
demand for home jobs. One of the most obvious channels through which home jobs
may be affected is the employment allocation of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
However, surprisingly little work has been done on how labor demand decisions of
MNEs with affiliates in different locations are driven by labor cost differentials. This
paper uses data on over 1,200 European MNEs and their affiliates to analyze how
parent and subsidiary employment may be substituted.
From figures 1 to 3, which show the evolution of foreign direct investment (FDI)
in the OECD, it is clear that since the early 1990s both inflows and outflows of FDI in
the OECD regions have increased rapidly. This rapid growth has occurred in both the
industrialized countries and the less developed ones. In the context of the
liberalization of CEE, figure 3 shows that in a period of less than 10 years there has
been a seven fold increase in FDI inflows into Central and Eastern Europe
2. In this
paper we will make a distinction between subsidiaries located within the EU versus
those located in CEE, to assess whether competition from low wage countries has
contributed to the relocation of employment.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) We find evidence for
substitution effects between parent and foreign employment. However, contrary to the
popular belief, this substitution effect is mainly taking place between parents and their
EU based subsidiaries. This result, though, is consistent with what theory would
predict. (ii) The substitution between parent and foreign employment depends on
whether the firms operate in the manufacturing or the non-manufacturing sector. For
manufacturing firms the substitution effect is mainly taking place between parent and
foreign employment in subsidiaries located in the EU, while for non-manufacturing
                                                          
1 For recent overviews see Johnson and Stafford (1999) and Slaughter (1998).
2 Bevan and Estrin (2000) analyze the determinants of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe where the6
firms the substitution effect in mainly taking place between parent and foreign
employment in subsidiaries that are located in CEE. However, this effect is driven by
firms operating in the wholesale trade and construction sectors. For service firms we
find no substitution effects.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we provide a literature
background, while in the third section we provide a theoretical and econometric
framework. The fourth section discusses the data set that we use and the fifth section
reports estimates of labor demand functions for parent companies. Section six
performs some robustness checks of our analysis. In section seven we give our
conclusions.
2. Related Literature
There are three broad sets of studies that look at how international trade
affects labor market outcomes.
 The first set has focused on how much international trade has contributed to
changing wages and employment. Freeman and Katz (1991) report a significant
correlation between import volumes and employment plus a statistically significant,
but small, relation between imports and wages. Revenga (1992) using industry prices
and source-weighted industry exchange rates finds that changes in import prices have
had a significant effect on both employment and wages in US manufacturing. While
Feenstra and Hanson (1995) formulate a model of international outsourcing of
production to assess the impact of relocation by marginal production activities from
the US. They find evidence that outsourcing is raising US and foreign wage
inequality. Earlier studies such as Grossman (1986) conclude that foreign competition
is not responsible for employment loss in the US steel industry. While Grossman
(1987) for nine manufacturing industries between 1969-79 find import competition
affected employment in only one industry and wages in only two industries.
The second set of studies initiated by Bhagwati (1991) has focused on
explaining the increased wage inequality through international trade and technological
progress. He concludes that the trade focused explanation for rising U.S. wage
inequality is not very plausible. Further research by Sachs and Shatz (1994)
                                                                                                                                                                     
role of EU accession  in FDI flows is studied.7
separating the effects of computer prices from other sectors, found that for non-
computer sectors international trade contributed to increasing US wage inequality.
Leamer (1998) looks at wage inequality driven by product price shifts during the three
periods 1960s, 1970s and 1980s for manufacturing. He concludes that increases in
wage inequality during the 1970s were caused by product price changes.
Furthermore, Krueger (1997) indicates a positive correlation between product-price
increases and skill intensity.   Thus she concludes that the magnitude of product price
increases and wage changes for skilled and unskilled workers are roughly comparable.
Baldwin and Cain (2000) find that both international trade and technological progress
have contributed to increased wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. In
contrast, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) find no clear evidence that the raising of the
relative price for skilled-labor-intensive products has caused increasing US wage
inequality. While Harrigan and Balaban (1997) find that the main component behind
changing relative-prices which contribute to rising wage inequality was a substantial
increase in the price of non-traded products relative to traded products. Finally,
Slaughter (2000) cannot find strong evidence that international trade has mattered in
explaining increased wage inequality in the US.
 A third set of studies has received remarkably little attention in the literature
so far, it deals with the question of how multinational enterprises may relocate part or
all of their home employment to other countries.
Most papers dealing with these issues, however, have used sector level data to
address questions of employment allocation of MNEs. Yet, within the same sector
domestic and foreign firms are both usually active, hence sector level data may not
take this firm level heterogeneity within sectors into account. This suggests that the
right unit of analysis should be the MNE, rather than a sector in which both domestic
firms and MNEs operate. Slaughter (2000) uses US sector level data to assess the
effects of multinational transfers on labor demand. MNE transfer tends to have small,
imprecisely estimated effects on US relative labor demand, which is inconsistent with
substitution of unskilled labor between parent firms and their affiliates. Brainard and
Riker (1997) use firm level data and find weak substitution effects between parent
firms and subsidiaries that are located nearby, but they find that substitution of
employment is especially occurring between different subsidiaries in developing
countries. In contrast, Bruno and Falzoni (2000) argue in a recent paper that once
adjustment costs are taken into account strong substitution effects can be found,8
especially between parent firms and their affiliates in developed countries, while they
find complementarity in the long run. Also, Blomström, Fors and Lipsey (1997) using
firm level data, find that US multinationals have allocated some of their more labor
intensive operations to affiliates in developing countries. They compare their results
with those for Swedish multinationals and find no evidence in Swedish multinationals
of labor substitution between home and foreign employment.
Likewise, Hatzius (1998) uses firm level data of Swedish multinational
corporations to estimate constant output labor demand equations. He reports evidence
showing positive substitution effects between parent and affiliate employment in
estimating parent labor demand equations, however, no distinction is made between
the locations of the subsidiaries. Braconier and Ekholm (1999) also use Swedish firm
level panel data and find substitutability between parent employment in Sweden and
affiliate employment in other high-income locations.
In contrast to these latter papers, which use relatively small (census type) data
sets, this paper covers all medium and large sized parent MNEs in the EU with
affilatiates either in the EU or in CEE or both. Furthermore, this paper makes a
distinction between affiliates that are located in the EU versus those located in CEE.
This allows us to test whether the opening up of CEE has contributed to job loss in the
EU, an argument often used in the popular press.9
3. Theoretical and Econometric Framework
Consider a MNE that produces global output, y, with three input factors,
parent employment, Lp, daughter employment, Ld and capital, K,
) , , ( K L L F y d p = (1)
where F is the production function. We assume that K is perfectly mobile between
different locations. In our empirical model we also will assume that employment in
the subsidiaries can be distinguished between employment in EU subsidiaries and
employment in CEE subsidiaries.
Total cost minimization under the constraint (1) yields us the conditional demand for
parent employment
) , , , ( y r w w h L d p p p = (2)
























 wp is the parent unit wage cost, wd is the subsidiary unit wage cost, r is the unit cost
of capital and y is total output of the MNE.
An increase in the parent unit wage cost should lead to a decrease in the
demand for parent employment, while an increase in the subsidiary unit wage cost







which indicates that parent and subsidiary employment are substitutes. The larger this
derivative, the stronger is the substitutability between parent and daughter
employment and vice versa. In the extreme case where parent and daughter
employment are perfect complements this derivative is equal to zero. This essentially
is what we will be testing.
The theoretical literature on FDI location decisions distinguishes between
‘horizontal’ FDI and ‘vertical’ FDI (e.g. Markusen, 1995). The former type of FDI is10
more concerned with product market expansion, while the latter with exploiting
cheaper costs of production. We would expect that labor substitution is more likely to
take place when:
(i) The proximity to the final market matters to locate production, thus
substitutability is more likely to occur between subsidiaries and the parent
firm if they are located close to each other (e.g. Brainard, 1997).
(ii) If factor proportions are similar in the different locations. Since the
distribution of skills and other factors differ across locations, the degree of
substitution will differ.
These substitution effects can be estimated using the conditional demand for labor in
(2). It gives an indication of the technological substitution possibilities between parent
and subsidiary employment, given a certain output level. It represents the
technological possibilities to move along the same isoquant. Of course if relative
wages are changing then also the marginal costs of production are changing and
therefore the optimal supply of output. Hence, the assumption of having a constant
output in (2) may no longer be relevant. We can relax this assumption by deriving the
labor demand functions for the MNE from profit maximization. This yields the
unconditional or Marshallian demand functions for labor, where output is chosen
optimally according to the supply function of the firm. This implies that the demand
for parent employment is no longer a function of a given output level, but rather of the
product market price or
) , , , ( p r w w g L d p p p = (3)
Again, the cross-price elasticities give an indication about how home
employment is substituted for foreign employment, but now taking into account the
effect of wages on output. Equations (2) and (3) will form the basis of our empirical
specifications. In particular we will estimate (2) and (3) by assuming a log-linear
approximation. Furthermore, we assume that the input factor, daughter employment,
can be considered as two input factors, employment in EU subsidiaries and
employment in CEE subsidiaries. For equation (2) this reduces to the following
empirical specification for parent employment,11
jp j jdcee jdeu jp jp jp r y w w w L e a a a a a a + + + + + + = ln ln ln ln ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 (4)
where j stands for firm j, p for the parent and d daughter company,  jp a  is a firm
specific fixed effect that is not observable. This may include distance between the
parent and daughter company, in general it refers to unobserved heterogeneity, the
subscripts eu and cee refer to the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe
respectively, 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 1, a  are parameters to be estimated and e is a white noise error term.
An empirical tractable equation for the unconditional demand function of
labor (3) is a little more complicated since we need to find good proxies for product
market characteristics affecting the price in (3). We use sector level output (proxied
by sector level value added) as a proxy for general product market conditions that is
prevalent in a particular sector. We also use sector level unit wages and the
unemployment rates for each country in our data set. We include sector level wages
since changes in sector wide wage costs should affect the product supply function of
the sector and therefore equilibrium prices and finally we include unemployment rates
because these reflect aggregate demand shocks
3. So an empirical specification for the
unconditional demand function for parent employment is the following
jp country jdcee jdeu jp jp jp U w y r w w w L e b b b b b b b b + + + + + + + + = ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln 7 sec 6 sec 5 4 3 2 1
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where  jp b is an unobserved firm specific effect for parent firm j,  , 7 , 1 b b - are
parameters to be estimated.12
4. Data and Preliminary Facts
The data consists of all companies that have to report full company accounts
to the national statistical offices for which at least one of the following criteria is
satisfied: total turnover of at least 12 million USD, total assets of at least 12 million
USD or total employment of at least 150. Our data covers both manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sectors and covers all countries in the European Union plus
Central and Eastern European countries. This is a commercial database collected by
“Bureau Van Dijck” which is a quoted software and consulting company on the
(Euronext) stock market and is sold under the name of  ‘Amadeus’. The reported data
includes information on the ownership structure of firms, in particular, whether a
company is a part of a group or a multinational company. It provides information on
the identification of the parent company and all its subsidiaries. We matched all such
parent companies with their subsidiaries, the data appendix describes the construction
of the data set and the variable definitions. We only retained those MNEs that have at
least a 50% interest in their subsidiaries, hence, our data set covers the subsidiaries for
which the parent companies have effective control. The ownership information refers
to the year 1998. However, if a MNE reports a subsidiary in 1998 we assume it was
part of that MNE throughout the sample period that we observe
4.
Furthermore, we only retrieved the companies for which unconsolidated accounts
were available for both the parent and its subsidiaries. For some countries, such as
Greece and Finland, in the data set not all information that we needed was reported.
This is due to the local accounting legislation of reporting figures on value added and
wage costs. Our eventual data set covers 1,272 parent companies located in the EU,
with 3,164 subsidiaries located in the EU and 227 subsidiaries located in Central and
Eastern Europe.  The data covers the period 1994-98 and is in the form of unbalanced
panel data
5. Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of parent firms and subsidiaries
across the various EU countries. It can be noted that Germany, France and Belgium
                                                                                                                                                                     
3  We also experimented with using sector dummy variables interacted with year dummies as an
alternaive to proxy for product market conditions. The results obtained were very similar.
4 So, we are not able to trace changes in ownership over time. We believe this is not a very serious
problem since the results we obtain would be stronger if we would be able to identify the exact date of
control of a MNE in a given subsidiary. So, our results can be viewed as a lower bound.
5 This changing of firm numbers in the data set may be due to the criteria imposed by Bureau Van
Dijck to be in the data set, observations on some variables may be missing due to differences in
accounting procedures or due to takeovers and mergers. However, we are not able to identify these, but
as suggested before, this should imply that our results are a mere lower bound.13
have almost 60% of the parent firms in our sample. Subsidiaries are mainly located in
France, Italy, Spain and the UK. Only 6% of the affiliates are located in Central and
Eastern Europe in our sample.
Many parent companies have more than 1 subsidiary in different locations both in
the EU and CEE, thus in equation (4) we should include all the wages of all the
subsidiaries, however this would not be tractable. Therefore we consider two groups
of locations for subsidiaries, those located in the EU and those in CEE
6. We take the
average wage of all EU subsidiaries of a given parent firm to proxy wages of
subsidiaries located in the EU and likewise for CEE subsidiaries. Some of the MNEs
in our sample have affiliates located only in the EU, some only in CEE  and some
MNEs have affiliates in both regions. In our analysis we assume that locations are
exogenously given. Our data set only gives information on existing locations of
affiliates, but no information on when an operation was started in particular regions.
This assumption allows us to estimate equations (4) and (5) for all parent firms
together, where wages are set equal to zero if the parent firm has no affiliate in a
particular region
7. We also experimented with estimating separate equations for the
MNEs with only EU affiliates and MNEs with only CEE affiliates, our results
remained the same.
Table 3 shows summary statistics on the main variables that we employ in our
analysis. We proxy output by the total value added of the MNE using a weighted sum
of the value added of its subsidiaries and the parent value added. The user cost of
capital we proxy by taking the real risk free rate of return, which can also be
interpreted as the opportunity cost of capital. As we can see from table 3, parent
companies in our sample employ on average more than 2100 persons, while their
subsidiaries employ less workers on average. Furthermore, the average employment
of European subsidiaries is lower than the average employment of subsidiaries located
in Central and Eastern Europe. This is not surprising since unit labor costs are much
                                                          
6 We also experimented with splitting the EU into the ‘low wage’ EU countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy,
the UK and Ireland) versus the ‘high wage’ EU countries, however, our results did not fundamentally
change, so we proceeded with the EU versus CEE countries.
7 This is equivalent to estimating the following equation for (4):
jp j jd jd jp jp jp CEE EU r y XCEE w XEU w w L e a a a a a a a a + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln ln
where EU is equal to 1 if a MNE has an affiliate in the EU and zero else, CEE is equal to 1 if the MNE
has an affiliate in Central and Eastern Europe and zero else. By estimating this equation with a standard
mean deviations fixed effects approach or by first differencing, the coefficients  jp a , 7 6,a a drop out.14
lower in the latter region. Again from table 3 we can see that the unit labor cost is on
average 6 times lower than the equivalent in a European subsidiary. Furthermore, the
size distribution of firms in Central and Eastern Europe is also more skewed in favor
of large firms, a legacy of the communist period (Roland, 2000 p. 14). Although the
labor cost in Central and Eastern Europe is much lower than in Europe, also the
average labor productivity is much lower. The value added per worker is on average
lower in subsidiaries compared to the value added per worker in the parent company.
Furthermore the average value added per worker in EU subsidiaries is much higher
than the average value added per worker in a CEE subsidiary.
A first indication whether employment substitution may take place can be
obtained by computing the correlations between employment growth in parent firms
and the employment growth in their affiliates. We therefore regressed parent
employment growth on employment growth in the affiliates. Table 4 shows the
results. The correlation between parent employment growth and subsidiary
employment growth is negative and statistically significant, but only for affiliates
located in the EU. For affiliates located in CEE the correlation coefficient is still
negative, but not statistically significant. The negative sign suggests that as affiliate
employment increases parent employment decreases or that a substitution effect may
exist. In the following sections we will test this in a more structural way.
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5. Results
Table 5 shows firm level fixed effects estimates for equation (4) the
conditional demand for labor of MNEs. Column (1) gives the results for the overall
sample, while columns (2) and (3) for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
respectively. In column (1) the own labor demand elasticity (the effect of WP) is
estimated at –0.89. The effect of unit wage costs in subsidiaries located in the EU
(WEU), is estimated positive and statistically significant, however, the unit wage costs
of subsidiaries located in CEE (WCEE), is estimated positive, but not statistically
significant. In other words, a decrease in the unit wage cost of EU subsidiaries would
lead to a decrease of parent employment. Thus, parent employment and EU subsidiary
employment are substitutes. This suggests that relocation of employment in MNEs is
taking place among high wage EU countries and not so much between high wage
parent countries and low wage countries in CEE. Furthermore, this effect is even
stronger if we limit the sample to manufacturing firms only, where the elasticity of
parent employment with respect to the unit wage cost in its EU subsidiaries is
estimated at 0.125. Column (3) shows the results for the non-manufacturing sector.
Interestingly, the coefficient of wages in EU subsidiaries is now negative and
statistically significant, while that of wages in CEE subsidiaries is positive and
significant. Thus for the non-manufacturing sector it seems that parent employment
and subsidiary employment within the EU is complementary, while employment
between the EU parent and its CEE subsidiaries are substitutes. We would not expect
to find substitution effects in the non-manufacturing sector since traditionally it is
believed that there are more non-tradables in non-manufacturing. We therefore
experimented with defining the non-manufacturing sector more narrowly. In
particular, more than 30% of the firms in the non-manufacturing sector are operating
in the wholesale trade sector. We therefore ran the above regressions excluding the
wholesale sector. We also excluded the construction sector because construction
could be considered closer to manufacturing. In Columns (4) and (5) we report the
results for the non-manufacturing sector excluding wholesale trade and construction,
which we could call the service sector, and the results for the wholesale trade and
construction sectors respectively. It is clear that the substitution effect of column (3) is
mainly driven by the wholesale trade and construction sectors. Once we exclude them
we find no substitution between parent employment and affiliate employment in CEE.16
Interestingly in the wholesale trade and construction sectors we find substitution
effects between parent firms and their affiliates in CEE.
These results are confirmed in table 6 where we report the unconditional
demand functions for labor in the parent firm. Parent wages have a strong negative
effect on parent employment and unit wage costs in EU subsidiaries have a positive
and statistically significant effect on parent employment. This effect is driven by the
manufacturing sector. A decrease of 10% in the unit wage cost of EU subsidiaries is
associated with a decrease of 2.3% in parent employment in the manufacturing sector.
This effect is statistically not different from zero in the non-manufacturing sector. So,
once we take the scale effect into account in the non-manufacturing sector, wages in
EU subsidiaries do not matter for parent employment. However, wages in CEE have a
significant and positive impact on parent employment in the non-manufacturing
sector, while this is not statistically significant for the manufacturing sector. Again
this result is driven by the wholesale trade and construction sectors as can be seen
from columns (4) and (5).
The results suggest that MNEs in manufacturing when investing in EU
countries are mainly driven by ‘vertical’ FDI. This is also what theory would suggest.
Transport costs and trade barriers are low for subsidiaries located within the EU.
Furthermore, the relative factor endowments are similar in the various EU countries:
the skill composition of the work force and the equipment that manufacturing firms
have access to is very similar within the EU. In constract, manufacturing in CEE is
characterized by outdated equipment and low labor productivity (as can be seen from
table 3). So, substantial deep restructuring was needed in most of the manufacturing
firms (e.g. Roland,2000). Apart from these structural features, there are also a number
of institutional obstacles in CEE: market liberalization in many of these countries was
postponed, soft budget constraints persisted and trade barriers were raised shortly
after the opening of CEE to the rest of the world. So, this suggests that there are many
factors why ‘vertical’ FDI in CEE may be less likely to take place, but rather
‘horizontal’ FDI, aimed at obtaining first mover advantages and market access. This is
also what was found by earlier work on FDI flows in CEE based on firm level
surveys: Lankes and Venables (1996) and Abraham and Konings (1999) use firm
level survey data and find that labor costs were not the most important factor to invest
in CEE, rather strategic reasons related to market penetration and expansion were the
main driving forces behind FDI in CEE.17
The results for the non-manufacturing sector suggest that employment
relocation within the EU is irrelevant, but rather relocation between parent
employment and subsidiary employment in CEE is important. This result is driven by
investments in the wholesale trade and construction sectors. This makes sense if these
investments are especially distribution activities, where cheaper labor costs may be a
driving force to locate a distribution center in a low wage country. In these sectors the
factor endowments are arguably not so different than those in the EU. In distribution
activities no heavy equipment is used and the type of workers needed does not require
special skills. For the service sector we find no substitution effects taking place
between EU parents and their CEE affiliates. Given the non-tradable character of
services this is what we would expect.18
6. Robustness checks
In this section we look at the robustness of our results. One of the empirical
regularities characterizing MNEs is that they mostly operate in sectors which are
R&D intensive and that MNEs often are characterized by high levels of intangible
assets, which is often reflected in the skill composition of their workforce
(Markusen,1995). The data that we use have no information on the skill composition
of the workforce, so we treated labor as homogeneous. Slaughter (2000) has shown
for the US, that this may not be too much of a problem. He finds that MNE transfer to
low wage countries has occurred, however, he finds no evidence that this has
contributed to shifts in the relative demand for fewer unskilled workers in the US.
One way to test whether the skill-composition of the firm may matter in our analysis
is to include a proxy for skills. We include as a proxy the intangible assets as a
percentage of total assets in the parent firm. The higher this ratio the more likely firms
have a skill intensive labor force. Since we do not have this information for all of our
firms in the sample we loose a substantial number of observations. Nevertheless it is
an interesting robustness check and tables A1 and A2 of appendix 2 show the results
for the conditional and unconditional demand for labor. We can see that our main
results are not affected in both the conditional and the unconditional demand for labor
functions. In fact, we find that skill intensity has a positive effect on the demand for
labor in parent companies, while the estimated elasticities are not much affected. We
can also note that skill intensity only seems to matter for manufacturing firms and not
so much for non-manufacturing firms. The skill differences for the latter group of
firms are presumably less outspoken compared to manufacturing.
A second concern with the approach that we adopted is the potential
endogeneity of wages and output.  Furthermore the labor demand equations we
estimated so far are static labor demand equations, however, it may be the case that
there exists some dynamics in employment adjustment, e.g. due to adjustment costs.
To check whether endogeneity mattered and whether hidden dynamics is present in
our data we estimated both static and dynamic employment models where we treated
the own wage and output as endogenous explanatory variables. We employ the
simplest possible dynamic specification, by including a lagged dependent variable in
our estimations. Furthermore, since the unobserved fixed effect is potentially
correlated with the other explanatory variables we estimated the model in first19
differences to eliminates the fixed effect. This is essentially the procedure proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) for estimating dynamic panel data models with
endogenous explanatory variables.
By including a lagged dependent variable and because we estimate the model
in first differences we introduce an endogeneity in the lagged dependent variable. So,
we also instrumented the lagged dependent variable using the moment restrictions
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In particular, the advantage of using this
method over other commonly used panel data estimation techniques lies in its
efficient use of the number of instruments generated for the endogenous explanatory
variables. For instance, in a first difference model valid instruments for the lagged
dependent variable in 1998 are the level of the dependent variable in 1996, 1995,
1994, etc. since the lagged levels are not correlated with the differenced error term in
1998. In order to test the validity of these instruments a Sargan test of over identifying
restrictions is computed and is asymptotically 
2 c distributed. Because the model is
estimated in first differences the equation will be characterized by the presence of first
order serial correlation. However, what matters in a first difference model is the
absence of second order serial correlation if the error term in the levels equation is
white noise. Hence, we report a test for second order serial correlation which is
asymptotitically N(0,1) distributed. Since the model is estimated in first differences
and since lagged values (dated at least t-2 and before) of the endogenous variables are
used, we need to observe firms for at least 3 consecutive time periods. This implies
that we loose some firms in our analysis.
The number of parent firm level observations that we have available in each
year is shown in table 7.  Tables 8 and 9 show the results for the overall sample, while
table 10 shows the results for the manufacturing sector only. The first column of
tables 8 and 9 show the static model, while in the second column we allow for some
dynamics in the employment equation. Our earlier results for both the conditional
(table 8) and the unconditional (table 9) labor demand functions still hold. An increase
in the own wage of the parent firm is associated with a decrease in parent
employment. Furthermore, a decrease in the wage cost of the subsidiary located in the
EU leads to a decrease in the demand for labor of the parent firm. Thus the result that
parent employment and employment in EU subsidiaries are substitutes persist, both in
the conditional demand and the unconditional demand for labor. The diagnostic tests20
in the first column also suggest that the instruments that were chosen for the
potentially endogenous explanatory variables, the own wage and output, are valid
(Sargan test). Moreover, the second order serial correlation test suggests that there is
no serial correlation in the levels equation, which suggest that we do not miss any
hidden dynamics. Nevertheless, in column (2) we include a lagged dependent variable
to test potential adjustment lags in employment. We find a statistically significant
effect of the lagged dependent variable in both the conditional and unconditional
demand functions. Furthermore, our main results persist: the own wage effect has a
negative impact on employment in the parent firm, the wage cost of the EU
subsidiaries has a positive effect on parent employment, confirming the
substitutability between parent employment and employment in EU subsidiaries.  In
table 9, estimating the unconditional demand function, we also find a weak positive
effect of wage costs in the CEE subsidiaries, once we allow for adjustment lags in
employment.
Table 10 shows the IV results for the manufacturing sector and table 11 for the
non-manufacturing sector. The results we obtained earlier are robust to allowing for
the possibility of endogeneity and employment lags. Furthermore, we find for the
manufacturing sector that in addition to the substitutability between home
employment and EU subsidiary employment, also there is, albeit weaker,
substitutability between home employment and CEE subsidiary employment. Our
earlier results that for the non-manufacturing sector there is no effect of EU subsidiary
wages on parent employment and a positive effect of CEE subsidiary wages on parent
employment is also confirmed. Again, wholesale trade and construction drive the
latter effect.21
7. Conclusions
This paper used a large representative panel data set of more than 1,200 EU
MNEs and their affiliates located in the EU and CEE to test whether parent jobs are
substituted for by foreign ones. We estimated both conditional and unconditional
demand functions for parent employment. We find evidence supporting the presence
of substitution effects between parent employment and foreign employment, but the
effect depends on the sector, manufacturing or non-manufacturing, in which they
operate.
For manufacturing firms, we find evidence that EU firms substitute parent jobs for
foreign ones. This effect is only significant for affiliates located within the EU. We
find no strong evidence that employment substitution takes place between EU parents
and CEE subsidiaries. This gives support to the proximity hypothesis discussed in the
literature. For the non-manufacturing sector, in particular the wholesale trade and
construction sectors, we find that parent employment and CEE employment are
substitutes. For firms operating in the service sectors we find no substitution effects.
The results in this paper suggest that on average the opening of CEE should
not be viewed as a threat to European employment. It is rather competition between
EU countries that lead multinational parent firms to relocate employment between EU
locations.22
Table 1: Distribution of Parent Firms across the EU in the sample
















Table 2:Distribution of Subsidiaries across countries
Affiliate Country Frequency of Firms














Table 3: Summary Statistics
Overall Sample Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing


























Distribution of Firms 100% 66.7% 33.3%
Notes:    (1) Source: Amadeus (June, 2000)
(2) US$1,000.00 except employment
Table 4: Correlations between employment growth in parent firms and their
affiliates
Whole sample Manufacturing Non-manufacturing
















Note: (i) These correlations are computed on the basis of a regression of parent employment growth on
subsidiary employment growth, including year dummies. (ii) standard errors in brackets24














Wp -0.895*** -0.999*** -0.743*** -0.707*** -0.761***
(0.033) (0.041) (0.054) (0.086) (0.06)
WEU 0.073*** 0.125*** -0.081** -0.104** -0.022
(0.021) (0.023) (0.041) (0.049) (0.078)
WCEE 0.015 -0.013 0.103** 0.032 0.132**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.048) (0.084) (0.055)
Y 0.492*** 0.576*** 0.357*** 0.439*** 0.207***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.027) (0.035) (0.043)
R -0.018 -0.008 -0.109 -0.013 -0.305**
(0.046) (0.052) (0.093) (0.119) (0.146)
No. of
observations
3964 2650 1314 848 466
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies
(ii) *** indicates 1% significance level, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance
(iii) Robust standard errors in brackets.25













Wp -0.773*** -0.842*** -0.694*** -0.578*** -0.785***
(0.041) (0.053) (0.063) (0.102) (0.076)
WEU 0.148*** 0.227*** -0.043 -0.074 0.031
(0.026) (0.031) (0.050) (0.061) (0.092)
WCEE 0.033 0.007 0.116** 0.079 0.14**
(0.028) (0.032) (0.058) (0.101) (0.065)
R 0.140** 0.131** 0.125 0.126 0.118
(industry product
mkt. Controls)
(0.060) (0.070) (0.112) (0.148) (0.173)
Ysec 0.221** 0.205** 0.127 0.118 -0.008
(0.073) (0.106) (0.115) (0.146) (2.603)
Wsec 0.010 -0.044 0.148 0.259 -0.067
(0.101) (0.139) (0.163) (0.254) (0.658)
Ucountry 0.039 0.138 -0.208 0.006 -0.411
(0.111) (0.131) (0.208) (0.296) (0.285)
No. of observations 4222 2784 1438 935 503
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies
(ii) *** indicates 1% significance level, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance
(iii) Robust standard errors in brackets.26
Table 7: Structure of the panel for IV estimates




Total number of firms 805
Table 8: Conditional Demand for Parent Employment:




































Sargan Test 22.35 (df=10) 16.80 (df=15)
Second OSC Test 0.207 0.283
Notes: (i) All Equations include year dummies; (ii)*** 1% significance level, ** & * significant at 5%
and 10% confidence level, (iii) Lagged employment, parent wages and firm level output are
instrumented using all available moment restrictions from
t-2 back.27
Table 9: Unconditional Demand for Parent Employment:










































Sargan Test 16.7 (df=11) 17.60 (df=13)
Second OSC Test 0.753 1.274
Notes: (i) All Equations include year dummies; (ii)*** 1% significance level, ** & * significant at 5%
and 10% confidence level. (iii) Lagged employment is instrumented with all available moment
restrictions from t-3 back and parent wage is instrumented with all available moment restrictions from
t-2 back.28
Table 10: Conditional and Unconditional Demand for Parent Employment:
manufacturing sector only
IV Estimates using GMM (first differences)
Conditional Demand Unconditional Demand































































Sargan Test 9.01 (df=10) 14.4(df=12) 3.72 (df=5) 11.7 (df=7)
Second OSC Test 0.454 -0.920 1.304 1.197
Notes: (i) All equations include year dummies; (ii)*** 1% significance level, ** & * significant at 5%
and 10% confidence level, (iii) Lagged employment, parent wages and firm level output are
instrumented using all available moment restrictions from
t-2 back.29
Table 11: Conditional and Unconditional Parent Employment:
non-manufacturing sector only
IV Estimates using GMM (first differences)
Conditional Demand Unconditional Demand































































Sargan Test 8.26 (df=11) 8.44 (df=10) 7.48 (df=11) 6.76 (df=10)
Second OSC Test 0.534 1.263 0.855 1.311
Notes: (i) All equations include year dummies; (ii)*** 1% significance level, ** & * significant at 5%
and 10% confidence level, (iii) Instruments for parent wages and lagged employment include all
available moment restrictions from on employment and parent wages from t-2 back.30
APPENDIX 1
The Database
To construct the database linking EU parent firms with foreign daughters
located in the EU and CEE, it required a unique identifier. Amadeus contains the
National ID number of all firms and therefore, it is possible to link firms from a
multinational group. This is possible because Parent firms report having an ownership
stake in a foreign daughter identifying the daughter by national ID number. The
daughter firm reports the ownership structure of the firm giving the national
identification ID of the parent(s) and owner. Thus, we employed these unique ID
numbers to match a parent with all its foreign daughters.
We only kept those subsidiaries for which the parent company had an
ownership share of at least 50%. This ownership information, however, was only
available for the year 1998. So we assume that the ownership structure of the MNE is
the same throughout the sample period.
Definition of the Variables
Since some MNEs have more than one subsidiary we constructed the average
values of the variables of interest taken over all subsidiaries in Europe and the average
values of the variables of interest taken over all subsidiaries in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Total output of the MNE (Y): the weighted sum of value added in the parent company
and the value added of its subsidiaries, where the weight represent the importance of
value added in total value added for the parent versus the subsidiaries.
Unit wage cost of the parent (Wp): total wage bill of the parent company divided by
total employment of the parent company.
Unit wage cost of the subsidiaries in the EU (Wseu): the average total wage bill of all
EU subsidiaries of that particular MNE divided by the average total employment of
all EU subsidiaries of that particular MNE.
Unit wage cost of the subsidiaries in CEE (Wscee): the average total wage bill of all
CEE subsidiaries of that particular MNE divided by the average total employment of
all CEE subsidiaries of that particular MNE.
Unit cost of capital (R):  the real risk free rate of return in each parent country,
computed as the 10 year government bond yield minus the inflation rate in each
country.
Sector output (Ysec): the total value added in each 2-digit NACE sector in the EU,
source: computed from Amadeus.
Sector unit wage cost (Wsec): the total wage bill divided by the total employment in
each 2-digit NACE sector in the EU, source: computed from Amadeus.
Unemployment rate (U): the country specific unemployment rate using the
harmonized OECD definition, source: OECD.31
Appendix 2: Some Further Experiments: Controlling for Skills









WP -0.923*** -1.08*** -0.712***
(0.040) (0.052) (0.062)
WEU 0.077*** 0.139*** -0.092**
(0.024) (0.028) (0.045)
WCEE 0.019 -0.035 0.18**
(0.034) (0.037) (0.074)
Y 0.484*** 0.558*** 0.367***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.030)
R 0.015 0.008 -0.101
(0.057) (0.067) (0.10)





Notes: (i) All equations include year dummies; (ii) *** indicates 1%
significance level, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance, (iii)
Robust standard errors in brackets.32








WP -0.760*** -0.872*** -0.629***
(0.049) (0.066) (0.073)
WEU 0.156*** 0.247*** -0.058
(0.030) (0.036) (0.054)
WCEE 0.040 0.006 0.144*
(0.043) (0.05) (0.08)
R 0.179** 0.163** 0.126
(0.073) (0.089) (0.130)
Skill intensity 1.638*** 2.205*** 0.050
(0.403) (0.483) (0.072)
Industry controls
Ysec 0.174** 0.161 0.097
(0.08) (0.136) (0.13)
Wsec 0.032 0.060 0.038
(0.128) (0.179) (0.154)
U 0.432** 0.579** 0.011
(0.152) (0.184) (0.268)
No. of observations 3221 2030 1197
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies; (ii) *** indicates 1% significance
level, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance, (iii) Robust standard errors in
brackets.33
























OECD USA Japan EU 
Source: IMF Balance of payments statistics (2000)34
























OEDC USA Japan EU CEECs
Source: IMF Balance of payments statistics (2000)35



























Source: IMF Balance of payments statistics (2000)36
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